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1Networks in Entrepreneurship:
The Case of High Technology Firms
Abstract
The value of networks as integral part of the explanation of entrepreneurial success is widely
acknowledged. However, the network perspective lacks specification of the various dimensions
of a network and their impact on the early development of a venture. We make a distinction
between a Schumpeterian start-up pursuing a radical innovation and a Kirznerian venture on
basis of an incremental innovation. This distinction is introduced as a contingency in the way
networks contribute to the ability of the entrepreneur to discover opportunities, to get resources,
and to gain legitimacy. In this explorative study three cases on high technology firms in The
Netherlands provide empirical material to develop a number of propositions on the network
effect on the survival or performance of start-ups.
1 Introduction
In the network perspective the crucial role of external ties is emphasized to understand the start
and development of an entrepreneurial venture. In a number of studies (Birley, 1985; Aldrich &
Zimmer, 1986; Johannisson, 1987) the contribution of a network to the development of a start-
up has been examined. The network of an entrepreneur plays an important role in the search for
new opportunities and the quest for resources. In the case of innovative ventures, the network is
helpful to improve performance and gain legitimacy (Van de Ven, 1993; Baum et al., 2000;
Cooke & Wills, 1999). It is also argued that access to resources is one of the main roles of a
network, as the limited amount of resources is a main bottleneck for entrepreneurial ventures.
The overall notion is that a more developed network, in terms of the number of ties and the
quality of the ties, is more beneficial to a start-up than a less developed network.
2Although the value of networks as integral part of the explanation of entrepreneurial success is
widely acknowledged, there remains a number of unresolved issues. For example, the network
perspective lacks to be specific about the context and the timing of the role of network relations
(Bloodgood et al., 1995). And there is little specification of the various dimensions of a network
and their impact on the early development of a venture (Steier & Greenwood, 2000). In
addition, there are conflicting results; for example, ‘both strong and weak ties are argued to be
positively related to performance’ (Rowley et al., 2000: 369) and for family start-ups the
internal network appears to be more important than the external network (Littunen, 2000). Also
in the social capital literature strong ties are not only positively related to performance, but in
some cases they are believed to be detrimental to performance (Gargiulo & Benassi, 1999).
Recently, some contingencies have been introduced to the particular role of certain network
relations in the early development of a venture. Birley (1985) acknowledged the different
contribution of informal contacts and formal ties in early corporate evolution. Rowley et alia
(2000) introduced the industry context as a contingency. They showed that in a highly dynamic
environment weak ties are positive related to the performance of firms, while in a stable
environment strong ties appeared to be positively related to performance. In this study another
contingency is introduced, namely the type of innovation of an entrepreneurial venture. We
argue that there exist distinct configurations of entrepreneurs and their supportive networks with
different processes of sensing opportunities, acquiring resources and obtaining legitimacy. Two
types of entrepreneurial modes are put forward: a Schumpeterian start-up pursuing a radical
innovation and a Kirznerian venture on basis of an incremental innovation are distinguished
(Cheah, 1990). Furthermore we examine the requirements on the network of these two types.
This distinction between a Schumpeterian and a Kirznerian entrepreneurial modes will be
introduced as a contingency in the way networks contribute to the performance of start-ups The
early growth of start-ups is affected by the perception of opportunities, the ability to get access
to resources and the ability to gain legitimacy. These three variables are important for the
survival of start-ups and networks have an effect on the way entrepreneurs deal with them.
3In short, the leading research question for our paper is the following: How do networks affect
the ability of entrepreneurs, in Schumpeterian versus Kirznerian start-ups, to discover
opportunities, to get resources and to gain legitimacy. By introducing these contingencies we
address the challenge posed by Leenders & Gabbey (1999: 485): ‘The search for contingency
factors can be guided by the following question: which social structure is beneficial/detrimental
for whom, which goals (..)’. Our focus is on the network strategies high technology start-up
firms pursue (or have pursued) to ensure growth and find support and recognition by significant
others. Before discussing the particular role of networks in the early growth of high-technology
firms, we first discuss some perspectives in entrepreneurship theory in general, and on the
networking entrepreneur in particular.
Three case studies of ICT and biotechnology companies from the Netherlands are discussed. In
this explorative study the cases provide empirical material from which we develop some
propositions concerning networking effect on the success of high-tech start-ups. One of the
three case companies is successful, one went bankrupt and failed, and the performance of the
third one is still unclear but it manages to  survive. All of them faced a number of hurdles which
needed to be taken in order to survive. Some of the impediments were merely of a technological
nature (e.g. hampering product development), others included the financial-organisational
bottlenecks that threaten the start-up firm's early growth (e.g. lack of capital, customers and
business partners). In addition, the companies faced the difficulty of gaining cognitive and/or
socio-political legitimacy. We  review how particular network relations and strategies have been
helpful to overcome these hurdles.
2 Towards a theory on the networking entrepreneur
2.1       Emergence of networking in entrepreneurship theory
4The field of entrepreneurship involves the study of sources of opportunities and enterprising
individuals who discover, evaluate, and exploit them (Shane & Venkataraman, 2000). Three
components of entrepreneurship theory can be distinguished: the characteristics of the
entrepreneur, the opportunities, and resources to exploit opportunities. Each of them has been
examined extensively in disciplinary fields as psychology and economics. For example, in the
personal traits perspective the issue is whether particular psychological characteristics of
individuals make them prone to behave and succeed as entrepreneurs (Brockhaus & Horwitz,
1985). However, this approach has had difficulties to find strong empirical evidence. One of the
problems is the selection bias (Aldrich & Zimmer, 1986; Amit et al., 1993). Each of the
disciplinary perspectives have its limitations to explain entrepreneurship. In addition, the
environment has been treated too much as an externality in entrepreneurship theories (Van de
Ven, 1993). The way a start-up is embedded in their environment is seen as a factor which may
help or constrain the entrepreneur. The network consists of resource providers, government
agencies, potential clients, and other stakeholders. They should be incorporated into the way we
conceptualize entrepreneurship.
In this study we view the networking approach as a way to provide a linkage between the
components of a theory on entrepreneurship. This linkage may improve our understanding of
entrepreneurship as it opens the possibility to view entrepreneurship as a dynamic process
(Aldrich & Zimmer, 1986). Networks, first of all, facilitate and constrain the entrepreneur to
find lucrative opportunities. Secondly, entrepreneurs draw on their network to pursue
opportunities as they provide access to resources. Thirdly, networking is helpful when the
emerging firm of the entrepreneur requires legitimacy. Thus the network approach appreciates
the embeddedness of start-ups within the economic and social environment and we distinguish
three distinct contributions of networks to the ability of entrepreneurs to seize opportunities. The
three are: the ability to discover opportunities, the ability to secure resources, and the ability to
gain legitimacy. These three roles of networks in entrepreneurship (Birley, 1985; Aldrich &
Zimmer, 1986; Larson & Starr, 1993; Van de Ven, 1993) will be shortly discussed (see figure
1).
5- figure 1 about here -
Opportunities
In the search for opportunities networks play a central role. In one of the first studies on this
role, Birley (1985) carefully documented how often entrepreneurs seek advice and feedback on
the core ideas of their business plan, when they turn to friends and family for local issues, and
when they use formal ties to look for financial support. The start-up was seen as an iterative
process in which the number of informal and formal ties affected the success of the entrepreneur
to find a lucrative opportunity. The environment and the opportunities it contains are diverse and
uncertain. The network of an entrepreneur is a source of information to locate and evaluate
opportunities. The perception of opportunities by individuals is imperfect as they are limited by
bounded rationality and cognitive biases, therefore the network must be included as it influences
the perception of opportunities (Aldrich & Zimmer, 1986). The search for information
constitutes a substantial part of the activities of an entrepreneur starting a venture. It is not only
purposeful search for particular data on markets, but also the search for information to monitor,
evaluate, test, and confirm the development of a venture (Nohria, 1992).
Networks and in particular the weak ties in the network provide access to information about a
diverse set of topics, ranging from potential markets for goods and services, innovations and
promising new business practices.  In the network literature a distinction is made between weak
and strong ties. Strong ties are built on a history of past dealings and in these relationships a
degree of trust can play a role (Aldrich & Zimmer, 1986). Weak ties refer to a divers group of
persons with whom one has some business connection. Strong ties are associated with close
friends, while weak ties can be connected to acquaintances (Granovetter, 1973). Weak ties
tend to be formed by people who work in different contexts, and therefore these people may
have access to different sources of information, resources and opportunities. Weak ties are
considered to lead to a more varied set of information and resources than the strong ties can
(Bloodgood et al., 1995) and consequently weak ties enhance the ability of entrepreneurs to
6spot opportunities. Weak ties may raise the alertness of entrepreneurs and therefore the
network of weak ties of an entrepreneur may set into motion a chain of events, started by
spotting of an opportunity and leading to a new business start-up.
Resources
Providing access to resources is another contribution of networks to the venturing process.
Networks and in particular strong ties are important in getting the required resources to exploit
the spotted opportunities. Network members representing strong ties are more motivated to
help the entrepreneur than the network members with whom the entrepreneur has weak ties.
Potential entrepreneurs assess their ability to get hold of the required resources at relatively low
cost on the basis of their strong ties. Thus a network with sufficient strong ties raises the chances
that a potential entrepreneur will act as it reduces the perception of uncertainty about the returns
of investing in certain opportunities.
Entrepreneurs rarely possess all the resources required to seize an opportunity. One of the
crucial tasks of an entrepreneur is to assemble the resources that are needed. This is quite a
difficult task as in the initial stages of a start-up the financial resources are limited and given the
uncertainty about the growth of the venture it is not very clear how many resources are required.
One of the key survival strategies is 'asset parsimony' (Bhide, 1994; Hambrick & MacMillan,
1984). The required resources need to be secured at minimum cost. Paying the market price for
resource, such as labor, materials, advice and commitment is often too expensive. Social
transactions play a critical role in the acquisition of venture resources. These resources can be
acquired far below the market price, the entrepreneurs and also intrapreneurs employ social
assets such as friendship, trust, and obligation (Starr & MacMillan, 1990). It is interesting to
note that both independent start-ups and intrapreneurs use similar cooptation strategies for
taking advantage of underutilized resources of 'friends', such as begging, borrowing, scavenging
and amplifying (Starr & MacMillan, 1990, p. 84)
7Personal and business networks at the start of a venture develop over time. Through trial-and-
error and coordination both parties evaluate the feasibility and fit of potential resources to the
start-ups needs. In particular, some of the weak ties develop incrementally and become more
structured as communication and coordination intensifies  (Larson and Starr, 1993). As a result
some weak ties become strong ties. Strong ties can become trust-based relations with mutual
commitment and interdependence. Such strong ties are associated with the exchange of high-
quality information and tacit knowledge (Rowley et al., 2000).
Legitimacy
The third contribution of a network to the success of a start-up is the way it opens possibilities
to gain legitimacy. Gaining legitimacy is imperative in starting something innovative (DiMaggio,
1992). Stinchcombe (1965: 148-150) has introduced the notion of the liability of newness, or
simply stated, young organisations face higher risks of failure than old ones. Established
organisations have a set of institutionalised roles and tasks, stable customer ties, experienced
constituents, a surplus of capital and creativity (slack), and a shared normative framework at
their disposal, which all contribute to an effective provision of goods and services and their
ultimate survival. New firms and novel organisational forms, on the other hand, are more likely
to fail just because they still have to develop and acquire those prerequisites. The reasons for
higher mortality rates for new (types of) organisations include the creation and learning of new
roles (without role models), the development of new links with users and clients, the promotion
of trustworthy relations among (relative) strangers, and the high risks and socio-economic costs
of generating new markets (Stinchcombe, 1965). Faced with the aforementioned ‘liability of
newness’, a new venture has to organize institutional support and legitimacy. This appears to be
in particular the case for relatively radical innovations. Novel ways to combine resources or to
enter new markets create conditions of high uncertainty. This uncertainty rises as the new
venture breaks with established norms or the industry ways of doing business. In such a case of
Schumpeterian entrepreneurship it is crucial to gain legitimacy in order to proceed.
8Although often referred to as key to organisational evolution, a proper definition and use of the
concept legitimacy in theoretical and empirical organisational research is hard to find. Pfeffer and
Salancik (1978; 194) have made the point that legitimacy is intangible and non-proprietary; it is
‘conferred status and, therefore, always controlled by those outside the organisation.’ Suchman
(1995: 574) has defined legitimacy in a broad sense as ‘a generalised perception or assumption
that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially
constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions.’ Aldrich and Fiol (1994) make a
distinction between cognitive and socio-political legitimacy. Understanding the nature of the new
venture is referred to as cognitive legitimacy. It has to do with the spread of knowledge about
the new business concept. The second, related, type of legitimacy is labeled socio-political
legitimacy and refers to the extent key stakeholders accept the new venture as appropriate and
conforming to accepted rules and standards.
Achieving sociopolitical legitimacy is in particular difficult when the new venture is very novel
and challenges the existing industry boundaries. In those cases changes in the institutional
framework are often required. Entrepreneurial ventures, which require changes in institutional
regulations in order to accommodate its development have a strong incentive to organize
legitimacy. In the study by Aldrich and Fiol (1994) a number of strategies on the part of the
founding entrepreneurs are discussed to overcome existing legitimacy barriers. Concerning
cognitive legitimacy network actors, such as, competitors, distributors and universities, should
be mobilized to create partnerships in order to achieve a wider understanding of the new
concepts. Organizing sociopolitical legitimacy asks for collective action, negotiations with other
industrial constituents and joint marketing and lobbying efforts.
2.2  New contingent networking approaches
Increasingly the simple causality between the size and diversity of the network and venture
success is challenged. In certain circumstances the need for information, resource openings and
9links to legitimate parties is overwhelming. This situation may in particular arise for new
technology-based firms (Nohria, 1992) as complexity and uncertainty in these ventures is high.
In these cases priority has to be given to certain ties. The efficiency of the network becomes an
issue in the debate on the contribution of the network to the performance of the start-up. More
generally, Burt (1992) argues that an efficient network, one with a minimal number of redundant
ties, improves the performance of start-ups. The entrepreneur should try to get access to
different clusters and minimize the number of ties to each cluster. Thereby the danger of network
overload is reduced (Steier & Greenwood, 2000).
A related debate concerns the beneficial or detrimental effects of a dense network with trust and
strong ties versus a sparse network with few redundancies and weak ties on the performance of
entrepreneurial ventures. In a network with strong ties the exchange of information and tacit
knowledge may strengthen the position of the focal firm. Firms in such as network benefit from
these ties as they are helpful for joint problem solving, learning and coordination (Coleman,
1988). Within a relatively closed network there is a lot of flexibility to explore new relationships
and opportunities. The benefits of such a dense and trust-based network is referred to as
‘Coleman rents’ (Kogut, 2000). Besides the obvious benefits of shared norms, trust and
collective monitoring, there is increasing evidence that closure in such networks may also
hamper the development of some firms. In the literature on social capital, a recent article with
the illustrative title ‘The dark side of social capital’ (Gargiulo & Benassi, 1999) showed that a
dense and trust-based network may have some liabilities as well. For example, the ability to
access new information from other clusters may be hampered as there is a strong focus on the
existing network. Firms which need networks for its explorative capabilities should not be
locked into a ‘Coleman’ network. They can benefit much more from the structural holes in a
‘Burtian’ network. A Burtian network contains many weak ties and firms in such a network are
in a good position to explore the environment for new innovations and unique information. The
benefits of such a network accrue to the firm with such network and have recently been labelled
by Kogut (2000) as ‘Burtian rents’.
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Recently, the contingency argument has been introduced to put the networks in which
entrepreneurs are embedded and in which they participate into perspective. What companies
require from their contacts and contracts varies across firms (e.g. the goals and the needs they
have and the stage of development they are in), across sectors and across time; in the words of
Rowley et al. (2000: 383): ‘both strong and weak ties are beneficial to firms but under different
conditions - for different purposes and at different times’. For instance, it has been proposed
that in the initial or even nascent stage, family and other strong ties play an important role, while
later on formal contractual relations become more dominant (Birley 1985; Bloodgood et al.,
1995). In addition, in the study by Rowley and associates (2000) the industry context was
introduced as a contingency. They showed that in a highly dynamic environment weak ties are
positive related to the performance of firms, while in a stable environment strong ties appeared
to be positively related to performance. In this study another contingency is introduced, namely
the type of innovation of an entrepreneurial venture.
In a recent empirical study (Rowley et al., 2000) these different roles of certain network
configurations were reconciled by introducing the industry context as a contingency: different
degrees of environmental uncertainty and varying rates of innovation impose different
requirements upon firms what they want from their (future) networks. Rowley et alia (2000)
showed that in a highly dynamic environment of the semi-conductor industry weak ties were
positively related to the performance of firms, while in the steel industry strong ties appeared to
be positively related to performance.
In this study we want to introduce the type of innovation, radical versus incremental, as another
contingency. A radical innovation in the Schumpeterian way requires a different role of the
network than a start-up introducing an incremental innovation. The research question is how the
relations and structure of the network contributes to the ability of start-up to access information
and mobilize resource and legitimacy. We expect that the network contribution differs for the
type of innovation. This distinction is in particular relevant for high-tech start-ups These start-ups
face large information requirements as the new technology is often not yet proven and the
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market potential is also unknown. The network support they need varies. We expect that there
is a substantial difference whether the start-up is pursuing a radical innovation rather than an
incremental innovation.
3.  High-tech start-ups and early growth
New technology-based firms often have ambitious growth targets of achieving substantial sales,
obtaining crucial patents or preparing for a stock market listing within 5-10 years after their
formation. They are characterised by R&D efforts, experimentation, and a high percentage of
highly-educated employees with university or postgraduate degrees, working in corporate
laboratories and in new product development units (Martin 1994; Bolland & Hofer 1998).
These new technology-based firms are often established by college-educated engineers and
scientists with prior business experience, who focus on the production and commercialisation of
new technological knowledge and innovations. University spin-offs and new technology-based
firms try to keep or establish a link between the science and business communities by carrying
out joint research and relying upon licensing agreements and various alliances to commercialise
their new technologies and products.
New high technology firms face a number of hurdles on their path towards commercial success.
In order to reach a relatively secure position in a market segment or production network, the
high-technology start-up firm needs to acquire the resources, skills, and find internal and
external partners. High technology start-up firms face the difficult task of exploiting its initial
innovation before it is challenged by stronger and more experienced rivals while simultaneously
establishing the technological capability for a continuing stream of follow-up innovations. Some
of the bottlenecks young firms have to overcome are related to the scientific and technological
uncertainties which may hamper product development, regulatory approval and market
launching. Also the lack of financial and organisational resources may threaten the start-up firm’s
survival and constrain its growth, such as a lack of capital and professional management, and the
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difficulty of finding leading-edge customers and attracting international strategic partners. High
tech firms are often based on novel technologies and an innovative business model. There is an
absence of objective information and evidence about the new activity. As a result these high
tech firms lack legitimacy. Founding entrepreneurs have to develop strategies to gain legitimacy
The early growth of high-tech start-ups may be characterised by search and discovery to
establish a fit between the technological possibilities and the demands of particular niche
markets. During this process it is difficult to earn money and the financial requirements can be
partly explained by this period of minimal earnings. High-tech ventures often require more
capital and hence the role of the venture capitalist is bigger. In addition, the venture capitalist not
only provides capital, but also advise and counseling, and in some cases they bring in
complementary capabilities, such as managerial experience. This experience is needed to deal
with the high uncertainties in some of these emerging high tech markets. Another way to manage
this uncertainty is teams instead of a single entrepreneur. Team-based ventures appear to be
relatively successful in the first stages (Roberts, 1991). The high-tech focus of the founder needs
to be complemented by management knowledge.
A distinction can be made between radical and incremental innovations. Radical innovations
disrupt the existing economic conditions and requires a change in the business context, instigated
by a visionary and persuasive entrepreneur (Schumpeter, 1934). Incremental innovations on the
other hand are far less disruptive and are brought to market and exploited by alert entrepreneurs
(Kirzner, 1973). ‘Schumpeterian’ entrepreneurship promotes dis-equilibrium, new combinations
disrupt the existing conditions (Cheah, 1990). Some entrepreneurial start-ups cause radical
innovations and change the rules of the game in an industry. In contrast, ‘Kirznerian’
entrepreneurship is a process towards equilibrium: 'Entrepreneurial discovery is seen as
gradually but systematically pushing back the boundaries of sheer ignorance, in this way
increasing mutual awareness among market participants and thus, driving prices, output and
input quantities, toward the values consistent with equilibrium' (Kirzner, 1997, p. 62). In the
Kirznerian conception of entrepreneurship the alert entrepreneur discovers the existence of
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profitable discrepancies, gaps, and mismatches in knowledge and information the others have
not yet perceived and exploited (Cheah, 1990). These differences are expected to have an
impact on the role of the network in the development of a venture (see figure 2). The case
material will be used to formulate a number of propositions, for future testing, on how particular
networks affect the ability of entrepreneurs to discover opportunities, to get resources and to
gain legitimacy.
- figure 2 about here -
4 Cases of high tech start-ups
4.1       Methodology
This research is explorative and the object is not to test particular hypotheses but to contribute
to theory building in the field of high-tech entrepreneurship and network development. Because
of the inductive nature of the research the selection of the cases was not a random process, but
based on theoretical sampling (Eisenhardt 1989). The main selection criterium was
representation of firms from high-tech industries and start-ups with a traceable life course, with
data and details available about their formation, their product/service offerings, the personal
traits of the entrepreneur(s) involved, and their competitive and institutional environment. In our
case studies we focus on three (former) high-tech start-ups from the Netherlands: two ICT-
companies (the Wageningen-based Noldus and the Amsterdam-based Digicash) and one
biotechnology company (Pharming from Leyden). The collection of data was conducted through
interviews and discussions with founders and senior managers (two per company), other
interviews with the firm’s key people and company reports in newspapers and trade journals,
and analysis of company briefings and industry data. These multiple data sources were used to
be able to check the validity of the data. The next step was to describe the characteristics of the
14
three high-tech start-ups, their founders, and their early growth trajectory. In the following
section we compare and analyse the three case studies more systematically.
4.2       Noldus
Noldus main products are standard software packages, such as The Observer, EthoVision
and UltraVox, which enable the collection and analysis of data of human and animal behavior.
The company's mission states that these products help scientists, engineers and practitioners to
study the behavioral processes, to automate measurements, to improve the quality of their data,
and to increase their productivity. In addition to the standard software packages they offer
integrated data acquisition and data analysis systems, including PCs and audiovisual equipment.
Furthermore, they also deliver custom software development, training and consulting services.
Applications to study human and animal behavior can be found in a large number of disciplines,
such as neuroscience, pharmacology, ethology, veterinary sciences, ergonomics, industrial
engineering, and sports research, which are found in many companies, government agencies and
universities. Noldus has over 1500 clients in over 65 countries. The main office is in
Wageningen, and Noldus has subsidiaries in Sterling, USA and Freiburg, Germany. In the ten
years of its operations it has grown from a one person -entrepreneur - company to a high-tech
firm of around 40 employees and sales of about 5 mNLG. Important clients are Bayer, Glaxo,
and Organon from the pharmaceutical industry; Microsoft, Oracle, and SAP from the software
industry; Ericcson and Deutsche Telekom from the telecommunication industry; DaimlerChrysler
and Volvo from the car industry; Lockheed Martin and NASA from the aerospace industry.
The company was started by Lucas Noldus shortly after he obtained his PhD from Wageningen
University in 1989. The first product was a software package based on the software
development during his PhD research project on the behavior of wasps. Already during the final
phases of the research, the interest of other researchers of animal behavior into the software
was substantial and provided a first indication of the market for such software. In the last stages
of his PhD, Lucas Noldus started to develop, in his spare time, a more general software
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application called The Observer.  The University was supportive, in the sense that they agreed
that he could use the University facilities outside office hours to work on his new software
package. In that case the University would not claim any intellectual property rights or royalties.
The University, however, was his first client after he started his firm. Mr Noldus started his firm
in an incubator building. Although he did not use some of the additional services for advice of
start-up companies in these type of buildings, Mr Noldus benefited from the discussion with
entrepreneurs from other start-up companies in that building. Incubator buildings facilitate the
learning from fellow entrepreneurs. The investments in product development and distribution in
the first years were funded internally and externally. Senter (national technology promotion
agency) provided some technical subsidies and internally he reinvested as much as possible in
the development of new software. His parsimonious policy for example went as far as allocating
only a minimal salary to himself, all he could save went into product development. When he
needed advice or information on a particular aspect of running his business he tried to avoid
expensive consultants. He rather turned to his developed network of Wageningen contacts to
ask how they solved that issue.
Most of the marketing efforts of Noldus are devoted in attending to conferences of relevant
research fields and getting in contact with researchers, engineers, and practitioners who can use
the software products to study behavioral processes. Marketing is networking and once the
contact is established the unique characteristics of the product are helpful in getting it sold. Most
of the markets are niche markets in the sense that Noldus is the first in that particular field or the
competitors are one or more steps behind. The marketing strategy can also be characterized as
a stepping stone approach. From the strong position in the pharmaceutical industry they got in
contact with researchers in the psychology and neuroscience field. Visiting conferences in the
latter disciplines gave them leads to new customers. An example of a recent client, Volvo, will
illustrate the dynamics. This client is using the Noldus software in the ergonomics group.
Ergonomics is an important discipline in the design of cars. The seating and position of the
instruments and the way drivers react to that can be analyzed using Noldus software. They got
in touch with the ergonomics people from Volvo at an ergonomics conference, and  the Noldus
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people attended the ergonomics conference on basis of suggestions of ergonomics researchers
they met at an psychology conference.
Growth driven by this stepping stone strategy has been substantial. However, it is a rather
labor-intensive marketing strategy and consequently it will be difficult to grow very fast. In fact,
the ambition of Mr Noldus is balanced growth, he is clearly aware of the dangers of very fast
growth. Growth is also constrained by his strategy to finance new product development and
new distribution channels by internal means. As a result he does not need venture capitalists to
finance growth of the company. This conservative growth strategy has resulted in a stable
growth path, with annual growth figures between 15 and 50 percent in the last 7 years, a
reasonable profit margin and a healthy balance sheet.
4.3       Pharming
Pharming is one of the leading players in the field of genetic manipulation, cloning and
successfully transferring genetic material from one life-form to another. This biotechnology
company is a listed medium-sized company with a workforce of approximately 150 people and
annual revenues of 13 mEuro (1999). After the Ministry of Economic Affairs had granted the
RijksUniversiteit Leyden (RUL) an R&D subsidy of approximately 1.5 mEuro to investigate the
possible production of biopharmaceutical proteins by transgenic cattle in 1988, the idea for an
academic spin-off came up. As a consequence, the biotechnology company GenPharm (the
forerunner of Pharming) was founded. The company was co-founded by Professor De Boer, a
biology professor at the RUL, who had previously worked at Genentech (the American
biotechnology pioneer) and Mr. Postma, an industrial liaison officer at the RUL. The ties
between the start-up company and the university were close from the beginning. GenPharm
located its corporate premises at the University’s Science Park and the RUL participated in the
company’s stock. Due to a general lack of venture capital and trust in biotechnology in the
Netherlands at the end of the 1980s, the founders came up with the suggestion for a two-tier
structure in which the Dutch/European subsidiary would be part of the larger American holding
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company GenPharm International (GPI), in which Genencore (affiliated with Genentech) and
Chimera Biotech had major stakes.
Initially GenPharm worked closely with the government’s agricultural laboratory IVO-DLO,
generating Herman, the first transgenic bull in the world, and the breeding of  cows (Herman’s
offspring) with human genes for the treatment of mastititis (a cow disease). For that purpose
the firm had set up further R&D and farm operations at various places in the Netherlands. In
1990, after a secret research contract had been signed with Nutricia/Numico, a Dutch nutrition
company and the American health company Bristol-Meyers-Squibb (BMS), GenPharm’s
involvement in producing biomedical protein in the milk of transgenic cattle shifted toward
serving the larger public with ‘humanised’ babyfood in particular and clinical nutrition for
patients (e.g. intestinal infection and blood poisoning). In the early 1990s, concerns about and
protests against the cloning of bull Herman and experimenting with its transgenic off-spring result
in pressures from animal rights activists on the Minister to ban the allegedly un-ethical activities
of Pharming. Due to ongoing political and financial support from the Ministry of Agriculture and
due to a massive awareness campaign, instigated and organised by GenPharm, in which various
associations of captive patients were mobilised, Parliament decided that there was no reason to
prohibit the experiments with bull Herman. Since the industry association NIABA had only
recently been created, the spread of information about transgenic technologies and raising the
public knowledge of biotechnology about its benefits to society had to be carried out by the few
companies themselves. Furthermore, in 1992, the Ministry of Agriculture granted GenPharm
another subsidy (approximately 1 mEuro) to continue its research.
Although very often in the spotlight, the company was struggling and the American shareholders
put GenPharm under increasing pressure. In 1993, a new CEO was appointed to streamline the
firm’s activities and, due to an internal conflict, co-founder Professor De Boer left GenPharm.
Two years later, GenPharm was divested from GPI through a sort of management buy-out and
received new investments from Dutch investors and the American Red Cross. The company
renamed itself Pharming NV. In the same year, Pharming acquired FinnGene Ltd, a small and
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specialised Finnish biotechnology company, a producer of EPO and human lactoferin).
FinnGene became fully integrated into the Dutch biotechnology company and was renamed
Pharming Oy. In 1996 Pharming set up a small laboratories and breeding farm in Belgium for
the development, manufacturing, distribution and sales of products for rare diseases.
The year 1998 was key in the corporate evolution of Pharming with expanding moves and
impediments happening almost simultaneously. Pharming set up a subsidiary in the USA
(Rockville, Maryland), close to its contract research partner, the American Red Cross, and
furthermore signed an agreement with the Genzyme Corporation to develop and commercialise
the enzyme human alpha-glycosides for treatment of Pompe’s disease (a lethal hereditary
muscular disease). In the same year, Pharming became a public company, when it was listed on
the Pan-European Stock Exchange EASDAQ (a year later it became also listed at the
Amsterdam Stock Exchange). In 1998, however, Pharming was also forced, due a final ban of
the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture on animal cloning, to relocate its dairy farm operations in the
Netherlands and transfer them to Finland, Belgium and the USA.
Over time, Pharming has transformed itself from a technology-driven into a (more) market and
product-driven company. Its objective has been to find niche markets for unmet medical needs
(e.g. the rare Pompe’s disease) and to expand the sales and marketing efforts of its proprietary
treatments. Pharming has developed an science and technology base by carrying out in-house
and contract research activities. Over the years, the company has built up a world-wide patent
position, consisting of about 10 patents filed in Europe and in the USA which churn out a steady
stream of royalties. Pharming is still very much dependent on subsidies and contract research,
without any products on the market place yet. In order to speed up R&D and the testing and
production of drugs and also leverage its intellectual property portfolio, Pharming is increasingly
working together with new academic groups (e.g. FinnGene), companies (e.g. Genzymen) and
other institutions (e.g. the American Red Cross). Early 2001, after approval from the American
Food and Drug Administration (FDA), Pharming may soon have its first marketable product.
Pompase, the firm’s therapy against Pompe’s disease, has now thoroughly been tested and the
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company is hoping that its treatment of Pompe’s disease will be granted an Orphan Drug status
(i.e. a sheltered commercial position for some years). Pharming is now preparing the launch of
this enzyme, in collaboration with its non-exclusive partner Genzyme.
4.4       Digicash
As expressed in its mission statement and throughout its corporate activities from 1990 to 1999,
Digicash has sought to offer solutions for security and privacy. The firm’s primary activity
was to develop and commercialise safe and anonymous payment technology products for small
money transfers over the Internet. In April 1990, Digicash was set up as a spin-off of the CWI,
the Centre for Research in Mathematics and Computer Science of the University of
Amsterdam. The founder of the company Dr. David Chaum, then head of the Cryptography
Group at CWI, is a world-leading expert in the field of cryptography. Initially, most of Digicash’
products and applications were based on his patents in public key cryptography. The main
reason to establish a company was the plan by the Dutch Government to develop a road pricing
system. Initially, Digicash started off with family capital of 2.5 mNLG for setting up the
company; the company did not have any backing from informal investors and/or venture
capitalists. As it did not immediately have any tangible products to sell, the start-up firm had to
rely upon the revenues generated by consultancy projects and contract research. Digicash
participated in a number of technology promotion projects sponsored by the Dutch government
and the European Commission. In 1995, Digicash was acknowledged as a successful high-
technology start-up in Europe and a potential winner in a business area thus far dominated by
American companies (e.g. Microsoft, SUN, Oracle): the company was awarded the European
Information Society Technologies’ (IST) prize by the European Union for its outstanding
contribution to technology and innovation.
The further development of Digicash was very much technology-driven and inspired by the
firm’s participation in several technology promotion programmes. Especially, the first five years
of the company were very much project-oriented, characterised by a kind of self-management
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being relatively chaotic and ill-structured. Digicash’s ultimate goal was to bring secure and safe
electronic cash into the main stream and to bind some larger clients to its (proprietary)
technology (it managed to issue a number of licenses to banks all over the world to experiment
with and use its e-cash technology). Besides in the financial services sector, the company had
also found business partners and clients from other industries (e.g. automatic road toll collection
and manufacturing/distribution of cryptographic devices). Although relying very much on public
funding and sales being very marginal, the situation for Digicash looked promising in the mid-
1990s: it employed about 50 people, was making a little profit, and it had embarked upon an
internationalisation strategy by establishing small subsidiaries in the USA and Australia.
In the early 1990s, the market for small-scale payments was still relatively open and fragmented,
offering potential for new entrants, including Mondex, Cybercash, and Digicash. In the mid-
1990s, however, things were changing and large competitors moved into Digicash’s domain: big
banks started experimenting with chipcards, Microsoft and others pushed for electronic money
as an add-on to Internet browsers, and MasterCard and VISA, together with a number of
software companies, were working hard on the joint promotion of which would later become
the Secure Electronic Transaction (SET) standard. Also in its home base, Digicash was left in
the cold. When the Dutch banks were working hard on designing a system for allowing on-line
payments (centred around their co-operative clearing house Interpay), they had approached
Digicash to participate in the project. Unfortunately, Digicash asked too much money for its
involvement and the banks eventually adopted the SET standard, which by 1997 had become
the de facto global standard.
In order to break into the US market and tap from the most recent technological and
commercial knowledge in electronic commerce, Digicash decided to move its headquarters and
research laboratory to Silicon Valley. The decision to move the company’s headquarters to the
heart of the Internet-revolution was strongly promoted by a group of American and Dutch
venture capitalists, who announced in April/May 1997 a major investment (between 10 and 15
m$) in the still pioneering company. For the first time, after having relied on subsidies and
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retained earnings (consultancy fees, patent/license royalties) to finance its expansion, Digicash
strengthened its capital base through venture capital. One of the investors’ demands was that
management needed to be replaced, because major business experience was lacking. Founder
Chaum stepped down as president and CEO of Digicash (as largest shareholder, he stayed on
as member of the Supervisory Board), and took up the post of Chief Technology Officer. Mr.
Nash, a senior executive, who was previously at Amdahl and VISA, was hired as the new
CEO.
Although nominated for the Dutch Broos van Erp prize for successfully promoting innovative
ICT technologies and applications, Digicash’ future looked bleak in September 1998: its Dutch
subsidiary ran into financial difficulties (and as a consequence staff had to be scaled to 6
employees), and the company lost its toehold in the US as the only bank testing its system, the
Mark Twain bank in Missouri, abruptly closed the 3-year trial with anonymous electronic cash.
A month later, their European offices were already closed and the Digicash holding company,
with a debt of 4 m$, had to ask for a Chapter 11 filing, and eventually went bankrupt. Finally, a
suitor was found to buy Digicash’ intellectual assets. The Seattle-based company, e-Cash
Technologies, in August 1999 announced the acquisition of the firm’s technologies, including the
patented blind signature encryption scheme.
5 Analysis of cases
5.1       Noldus
Noldus fits to the notion of Kirznerian entrepreneurship. Search for a successful product has
been limited. The department of entomology of the University was the first client and this lead
user provided sufficient feed back to enter the market with a well- defined product. The niche in
the market was discovered by an alert entrepreneur. The degree of uncertainty and the level of
ambiguity concerning the purpose and strategy of the venture was limited. The means to
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accomplish the development of the software package and to sell this package to the targeted
group of clients was, however, highly uncertain. In the initial period of the venture trial and error
is an important mode for learning about the development and planning of new products and
markets. In the initial stage the emphasis was on exploitation, sell this successful software
package to as many new clients as possible and develop software for different application as
efficient as possible.
The network of the Wageningen University has been used purposefully, for example to get
qualified employees and to get hold of resources at relatively low costs. The dense network in
Wageningen with many strong ties was helpful for this particular purpose. However, the
marketing of the product posed a different problem. Getting in contact with diverse users as
DaimlerChrysler, Bayer, Oracle, Ericcson required the exploration of a network of weak ties.
Contacts in a conference on ergonomics were used to get access to the car industry and the car
industry provided leads again to firms in other industries.
There has been only a slight legitimacy problem. The founder of Noldus once remarked that: 'I
never told my first corporate clients that the software was developed on basis of observations of
wasps, that might have damaged the credibility of the software'. Achieving legitimacy has not
been a major hurdle for Noldus. Sociopolitical legitimacy was not a problem, largely because
the standard software industry is well established. However, the type of software developed by
Noldus was new and achieving cognitive legitimacy was important in order to convince clients to
buy the software, to become a reliable partner for suppliers and other parties and to become an
attractive employer. Noldus was able to describe his software package in rather broad terms,
the collection and analysis of data on human and animal behavior, encompassing existing
knowledge. In addition, his collaboration with some research fields and the close ties with the
University has helped him to achieve cognitive legitimacy.
5.2       Pharming
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Although the company has done pretty well with having spotted potentially attractive
opportunities in the treatment of rare medical disorders (e.g. the orphan drug Pompase) and
acquired the resources needed in order to survive and grow (e.g. key patents, new people in
R&D and management, financing, business partners), sales are still negligible and its long-term
financial situation is still vulnerable. Probably, Pharming is the most famous biotechnology
company in the Netherlands, but sadly enough not because of its patent or product portfolio or
market valuation (Easdaq and AEX), but simply because of all the (inter)national mediahype
and controversy around Bull Herman. Most people did not know for what purpose the firm
carries out its cloning experiments or do not endorse them morally. In its Schumpeterian strategy
of being the lone ranger in a developing industry, Pharming could in its initial stages not rely upon
an established  trade association, which could inform the general public about biotechnology and
hold seminars to explain the activities of Pharming and its competitors. Pharming’s early search
for business opportunities showed a high degree of opportunism, only later to be replaced by
more stable ties with strategic partners (American Red Cross, Genzyme).
In terms of acquiring key resources, research money, knowledge and regulatory permission
were key to Pharming’s growth. It was able to play off the various stakeholders against each
other. To farmers and the Ministry of Agriculture, Pharming justified transgenic manipulation,
because this would eventually allow for a treatment of the cow disease mastitis. In a later stage,
Pharming found an ideal partner willing to stand up against the animal liberation front lobby and
defend its biotechnological experiments by aligning itself with groups representing patients
suffering from all kinds of hereditary diseases. Just because of the outside pressures and their
constant need by the public for new information, Pharming’s communications policy was not
always coherent over time. On a couple of occasions key information was manipulated, in which
the truth became economised or hidden. Also Pharming’s inexperienced communications
department and its subsequent hiring of an aggressive and professional PR firm to do the
political lobbying for them led to a lack of consistency over time.
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The company’s goals and activities became very controversial with a selective spread of
knowledge, depending on the various interests of the group of internal and external
stakeholders. The founders could draw upon their strong and dense network in the R&D
constituency of the emerging biotechology industry; for the further development of their
company weak ties with marketing and PR/lobbying professionals would have been benefical. It
was only later that the company discovered the strength of those weak and more diverse ties.
The firm could furthermore rely upon its strong ties with the university, offering its prestigious
spin-off premises at its newly created technology park, and upon its American Genentech
partners, working closely with them (tacit knowledge).
Despite recognition in the academic community and among the constituents in the agri-business
and health care domain, Pharming’s cognitive and socio-political legitimacy was controversial.
This required, besides the aforementioned intensive information and education programmes, the
instigation of aggressive lobbying campaigns towards regulatory authorities and pressure groups.
Especially during the D-days for obtaining another round of allocating testing subsidies and
during political decision making on allowing animal testing and cloning, Pharming found itself
isolated. As a relatively young company Pharming was still building up a credible reputation and
furthermore lacked a network with strong and close ties (e.g. through a widely recognized
industry association, and international partners), and loose and diverse ties that would contribute
to an understanding of its cause (e.g. alignment with both patient organisations and the animal
rights organisations). After cloning had been banned and it had moved its farm operations to
other countries, Pharming worked towards establishing close ties with recognized organisations
(e.g. partnering with the American RedCross and international market leader Genzyme) and
accomodating the various pressure groups by participating strongly in a society-wide cloning
debate.
5.3       Digicash
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In the early and mid-1990s, when a number of trials with on-line payments were carried out,
expectations of these new financial systems were high. At that time people were fearful of using
credit cards to pay over the Internet: this was the opportunity for new business Digicash and
others start-ups spotted. Over the years with the proliferation of the Internet and electronic
commerce, however, this fear seems to have subsided and most consumers prefer to use credit
cards for arranging secure transactions (or still relying upon traditional means of payments, e.g.
cash or cheques after delivery in Western Europe). Compared to the potential of revolutionary
Digicash-like systems, consumers instead preferred an evolutionary change towards adjusting
the already established credit card system for secure on-line payments on the basis of the widely
accepted SET-standard. As an insurgent into the market for facilitating financial transactions,
Digicash could not cope with the ‘gradual conservatism’ of the credit card companies and the
banking community, effectively exploiting the large installed base of credit cards and the inertia
of consumers in general and credit card holders in particular. As a small company, Digicash did
not have major partners in either the financial community and/or in the software world.
Over the years, Digicash has increasingly focused on software and de-emphasised its efforts on
smart cards: as such it shifted from a Kirznerian to a Schumpeterian mode. Like its electronic
cash technologies, Digicash’ applications for secure electronic voting and road pricing were
welcomed by policy makers as interesting technical solutions to socio-economic problems, but
actual procurement of its technologies was negligible. As a consequence of its structural
dependence on grants and technology subsidies in the Dutch and European setting, Digicash
became very sceptical about government support. In its formation stage, the high-tech start-up
releid upon the close ties with its source organisation, the CWI Lab, by hiring a number of
researchers and locating the firm at the University’s science park. Just because it continued to
rely upon dense ties with similar R&D partners and working with them in numerous
government-sponsored projects, Digicash could not develop into a market-driven and product-
based organisational structure. Despite its high involvement in those pilots and sharing tacit
knowledge in technology consortia, Digicash’ activities continued to focus primarily on
innovation and exploration without raising revenues from selling products and licenses. The
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company did not have the weak and diverse ties needed to tap into other businesses (e.g.
banking and software) and the larger American software and credit card companies, actively
involved in setting the SET-standard. Digicash’s cognitive legitimacy was very much targeted
towards its R&D network of contractors and partners, with limited attention to the large
business users and the general audience.
The market for micro-payments is still something of a non-starter, or formulated in the words of
Aldrich and Fiol (1994): it is an industry in creation where fools like Digicash and other pioneers
in-on-line payment systems rushed in and ran into trouble. The problem for the struggling
Digicash was whether there really is/was a market for micro-payment solutions in which the
company sought to specialise (i.e. electronic cash at a low cost that was anonymous and
secure): the legitimacy of the industry and the start-up firms active in that market was
low/moderate. Although the cognitive legitimacy of its activities was reasonable with more or
less everyone customer agreeing on the need for safe and anonymous payment systems for
(future) Internet transactions (shopkeepers were more sceptical), Digicash’ socio-political
legitimacy was low: the firm itself did not put a lot of effort in making itself known in the market
place and or in the policy arena. Instead of working with key business partners and support
from governments on a international dominant standard, the company was still doing one
experiment after another. As a Schumpeterian start-up working on a proprietary standard for
micropayments, Digicash could not allow to be left aside by the key players in the domestic and
international arena (credit card companies and software companies). Unfortunately the firm had
not developed either close or weak ties with them, and eventually found itself marginalised as a
beautiful loser in the new Internet-based economy.
- table 1 about here -
6 Concluding remarks
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One of the arguments in the paper is that the more start-ups are able to discover and exploit
opportunities the higher the performance of a start-up. Particular network relations are benefical
or detrimental to the discovery and exploitation of opportunities. The effect depends on the type
of innovation (Schumpeterian/radical versus Kirznerian/incremental) and the purpose of the
network effect (discovering opportunities, securing resources, and gaining legitimacy).
Concerning the discovery of opportunities the cases provide material to illustrate how weak ties
were helpful to discover opportunities. The ‘stepping stone’ marketing approach of Noldus
clearly shows how new relations at one conference lead to other networks linked to other
industries and particular niches. At the same time the failing Digicash entrepreneurs were unable
to spot lucrative opportunities for its novel technology. To some extent this may be explained by
their lack of diverse and weak ties. They appeared to be working very much within a dense
network with strong ties focussed on technological developments. Thus the contingency of type
of innovation seems to have no differentiating impact on the way network ties promote the
discovery of opportunities, in both cases weak ties are the driver.
Proposition 1
Weak ties promote the discovery of opportunities in both Schumpeterian and Kirznerian
start-ups.
Concerning the securing of resources, the second issue for start-ups, strong ties appear to be
beneficial in both the Schumpeterian and the Kirznerian situation. However, the causal
mechanisms are different. In the Kirznerian situation of incremental innovations the emphasis is
on exploitation and efficiency. Here strong ties are used to get a good deal and pay less than the
market price. Networks are used to support a strategy of ‘asset parsimony’. Different
processes to benefit from strong ties can be observed in the Schumpeterian case. The Digicash
and Pharming case show that strong ties are used to explore new research trajectories in close
collaboration with partners. Exchange of information and tacit knowledge is important and can
only be accomplished in trust-based relationships.
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Proposition 2
Strong ties promote the ability to acquire resources at low costs in Kirznerian start-ups.
Proposition 3
Strong ties promote the acquisition of resources from partners by exchange of tacit
knowledge in Schumpeterian start-ups.
Association with research institutes with high reputation, such as Universities, is helpful in
obtaining cognitive legitimacy, i.e. the the spread of the knowledge base and the broad
acceptance of the new firm. This has been the case for both the Schumpeterian and Kirznerian
cases. However, there is a difference between the Noldus case on the one hand and the
Pharming and Digicash cases on the other hand. In the Noldus case it is a new product for a
new market niche, but it is also software, which is part an established industry. Thus the
demands on the network to improve awareness and trusted knowledge about it is rather limited.
For the Schumpeterian cases the required diversity of strong ties is much bigger, as in both
cases real new activities, which build on a number of different industries have to become
understood.
Proposition 4
Strong ties promote the ability to gain cognitive legitimacy through association in both
Kirznerian and Schumpeterian start-ups.
As shown in the Digicash case where the company found itself closely tied up within the R&D
community, the company was unable to break out and reach for market- and product-oriented
applications. Furthermore the company was absent in the national and international regulatory
arenas, where the crucial decision was taken to support the joint SET-standard, supported by
two large software and credit card consortia. Also Pharming relied strongly upon its strong ties
with the research community and its health care and agri-business constituents. Moral concerns
from animal liberation groups and activists and regulatory hurdles were clearly underestimated,
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eventually leading to a ban on its cloning activities. As both cases illustrate, strong ties had a
perverse effect on the ability to gain socio-political legitimacy. Obviously, if those two
companies had developed a more diverse set of weak ties with different stakeholder groups,
they would have acted differently, more sensitive to societal and institutional concerns.
Proposition 5
Strong ties are detrimental to the ability to gain socio-political legitimacy.
Proposition 6
Weak ties may promote the chances to gain socio-political legitimacy.
The argument of this paper has relied upon two entrepreneurial - Kirznerian and Schumpeterian
- modes, which are opposed to each other. One could also argue that those two modes
complement each other or succeed each other subsequently, all depending on the life cycle of
the products, companies, and industry. In this study we have found evidence of this the
rotational symmetry of Kirznerian and Schumpeterian modes (Cheah 1990), in the evolution of
Digicash. Initially the firm sought to explore and exploit niche crypotographic applications, later
to be followed by an ambitous entry into breakthrough micro-payments. More research is
needed in which stages of their corporate life course pursue different kind of innovations.
For Schumpeterian start-ups network requirements in terms of diversity of weak and strong ties
are crucial for survival and future growth. Redundancies have to be avoided and priorities have
to be given to particular ties to avoid network overload. One strategy, as exemplified by
Pharming and Digicash, and also suggested in the literature (Steier and Greenwood, 2000;
Cable and Shane, 1997), is to get access to a new sub-network by linkage to a venture
capitalist. The added value of the network of a venture capitalist is more important to the
performance of start-ups than the provision of capital itself. Although in a later stage, both
Pharming and Digicash benefited from the input of extra resources (finance, human capital,
management expertise), the seizing of new market opportunities (e.g. focus on orphan drugs,
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relocation to Silicon Valley), and more cognitive and socio-political legitimacy, thanks to the
commitment of venture capitalists. Of course an increase of the start-up’s dependence is the
downside of such a far-reaching alignment.
The added value of the network of the venture capitalist has to be visible and credible: picking
the wrong venture capitalist (i.e. one with a limited and irrelevant network to the requirements of
the start-up), may be counterproductive. In fact, the Digicash case showed that the parties
taking care of the first round of financing did not add much in terms of the firm’s network
diversity and did eventually not much to save it from bankruptcy. As shown in the case of the
Schumpeterian start-up Pharming, however, a group of venture capitalists, provided access to a
relevant set of diverse networks and ultimately guided the company through further growth and
stabilisation. Obviously ties with some stakeholders are more important than others and to find
out more about the specific contribution of venture capitalists to the growth and development of
networks of entrepreneurs and start-ups is input for another research.
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figure 1: Research framework
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figure 2: Entrepreneurial modes
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Schumpeterian entre-
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table 1: Comparison of high-tech start-ups and their networking activities
Noldus Pharming Digicash
Type of innovation Kirznerian Schumpeterian first Kirznerian,
then Schumpeterian
Seizing
opportunities
weak ties (stepping
stone marketing)
strong & weak ties:
RUL & 2 ministries,
new customer groups
weak ties (project-to-
project)
Securing resources strong ties (asset
parsimony)
strong ties: exchange
of tacit knowledge
strong ties: exchange
of tacit knowledge
Gaining legitimacy
· cognitive
 
· socio-political
- strong ties (associa-
tion with university
- not relevant
- strong ties: leading
R&D labs & partners
- strong ties: detri-
mental effects
- strong ties (CWI +
A’dam science park)
- strong ties: detri-
mental effects
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